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MALAYSIA’S WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
CHALLENGE TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE:
AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Michael W. Meredith†
Abstract: Recent negotiations between Malaysia and the European Union (“EU”),
aimed at establishing a free trade agreement, have come to a standstill, due in part to a
policy implemented by the EU known as the Renewable Energy Directive. The
Renewable Energy Directive grants a tax credit to renewable fuel sources that emit at
least 35% less greenhouse gas than traditional fossil fuels. Malaysian officials have
criticized the 35% level included in the EU policy because it grants a tax credit to
rapeseed oil biofuel, produced mainly in Europe (which emits 38% less greenhouse gas
than traditional fossil fuels), but does not extend the credit to imported Malaysian palm
oil biofuel (which emits about 19% less greenhouse gas than traditional fossil fuels).
Malaysia asserts that the 35% standard is arbitrary and uses environmental policy to
achieve unrelated protectionist ends at the expense of Malaysian producers. Malaysian
officials have even gone so far as to threaten a lawsuit against the EU at the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”), arguing that the policy’s differential treatment of rapeseed oil
biofuel and palm oil biofuel violates the WTO’s policy of non-discrimination. The WTO
policy of non-discrimination stands for the proposition that like products should not be
taxed or sanctioned differently simply due to their nation of origin. Traditionally, to
determine if two products are alike within the meaning of the non-discrimination
principle, the WTO compares the physical characteristics of the products in question as
well as their end use in the consumer market. Because both EU- and Malaysianproduced biofuels are used for the same purpose and look almost identical, many
commentators have suggested that the two products should be considered alike and that a
Malaysian suit challenging their differential taxation under the EU Renewable Energy
Directive would be successful. Malaysia’s proposed suit, however, raises a number of
questions for the international trading arena that cannot effectively be addressed by
traditional methods of determining likeness. Therefore, this comment suggests that the
WTO should use this opportunity to adopt an economic, market-based approach to its
likeness determinations, which would not only more completely and correctly address the
relationship between Malaysian and EU-made products, but also indicate that Malaysia’s
proposed suit should fail.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The stated goal of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) is to
protect comparative advantage and economic efficiency in the international
trade market.1 One of the WTO’s primary means to achieve these ends is the
†
Juris Doctor expected in 2012, University of Washington School of Law. The author would like
to thank the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal editorial staff.
1
Although the ultimate goals of the WTO are, among other things, to increase global standards of
living, development, and reduced unemployment, the means to achieve those ends is the protection of
comparative advantage. AMRITA NARLIKAR, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, A VERY SHORT
INTRODUCTION 2 (2005).
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principle of “non-discrimination”—the concept that member countries
should not discriminate against similar or “like” products, through taxation
or tariff, simply because of their nation of origin.2 Traditionally, the WTO
analyzes whether two products are similar or alike by comparing the
products’ physical characteristics. 3 This method, however, excludes a
careful consideration of the economic and competitive relationship between
products in a given market. 4 As a result, optimally efficient WTO trade
policies remain the exception rather than the rule.5
Recent challenges to a number of allegedly discriminatory policies
highlight these limitations to the WTO’s traditional methods of determining
likeness. For example, Malaysia has criticized a European Union (“EU”)
policy that grants a tax credit to certain environmentally-friendly renewable
fuel sources as a violation of the WTO’s non-discrimination principles. 6
Malaysia’s criticism stems from the perceived “likeness” of Europe’s
domestically produced rapeseed oil biofuel to Malaysian palm oil. The EU’s
policy grants domestically produced rapeseed oil a tax credit, but does not
extend that credit to imported Malaysian palm oil due to the level of
greenhouse gas it emits when burned.7
Palm oil and rapeseed oil are substantially different in terms of
energy density, production costs, and environmental impact. 8 However,
because the two oils share similar physical characteristics, many
commentators suggest that Malaysia would be successful in a discrimination
claim at the WTO based upon traditional definitions of likeness.9 While
Malaysia has not yet filed suit at the WTO, Tan Sri Datuk Dr. Yusof Basiron,
the Malaysian Palm Oil Council’s Chief Executive Officer, has expressed his
intention to do so in a number of public statements.10
2

Id. at 15-16.
As will be discussed later in this comment, “physical characteristics” is one of two traditional
methods used by WTO panels. A second method is a comparison of the “end use” of a product for the
consumer. However, even this method often includes a consideration of the physical characteristics.
Robert E. Hudec, “Like Product”: The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY
BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 101, 104 (Thomas Cottier
et al. eds., 2000).
4
Id. at 106.
5
Id. at 104.
6
Hanim Adnan, Malaysia Cries Foul Over EU Renewable Energy Directive on Palm Oil, THE
STAR, June 7, 2010, http://deforestationwatch.org/index.php/Key-Papers/Malaysia-cries-foul-with-EURenewable-Energy-Directive-against-palm-oil.html.
7
Id.
8
Ayhan Demirbas, Fuel Conversional Aspects of Palm Oil and Sunflower Oil, 25 ENERGY
SOURCES 457-65 (2003). See also infra Appendix B.
9
Hanim Adnan, Malaysia Has Strong Case Against EU RED, THE STAR, Aug. 5, 2010,
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/8/5/business/6799755&sec=business.
10
Id.
3
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This comment suggests that, in order to both effectively address the
issues raised by Basiron’s proposed suit and to better achieve the WTO’s
stated goals, the organization should resist the impulse to apply
mechanically the traditional physical characteristics model of “likeness”
when considering Malaysia’s claims. Instead, the WTO should analyze
Malaysia’s suit under an “economic likeness” standard, taking into account
basic market indicators such as consumer demand, production cost,
international market interactions, and the level of competition between
products that traditional methods of determining likeness marginalize or
exclude entirely.11
Part II of this comment explores the political and economic
relationship between Malaysia and the EU that has given rise to Malaysian
threats of a WTO suit. Part III addresses why traditional methods of
determining likeness fail in the context of Malaysia’s potential suit. Finally,
Part IV explains the benefits of the “economic likeness” analysis in the
Malaysian case and proposes why the WTO should adopt the test in
analogous cases.
II.

BACKGROUND: A RECENT HISTORY OF THE TRADING RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN MALAYSIA AND THE EU

Neither Malaysia’s current antagonistic position towards European
trade efforts nor its interest in pursuing a WTO suit developed overnight. In
fact, Malaysia’s saber-rattling at the WTO reflects decades of stalled efforts
at strengthening economic ties between Asia and the EU.12 Thus, in order to
assess more fully the relevance and validity of Malaysia’s proposed suit, it is
useful to consider briefly the major historical and economic events that have
structured and informed the current relationship between these trading
partners.
For years, European exporters have attempted to gain fuller access to
Southeast Asian markets through trade agreements negotiated by the EU.13
The EU’s efforts to increase trade and commercial engagement in the region
have developed through: 1) failed multilateral negotiations aimed at
securing a generalized trade agreement with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), and 2) recent bilateral trading agreements
established with individual Asian nations, including Malaysia.
11

WON-MOG CHOI, “LIKE PRODUCTS” IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW xix (2003).
Javier Delgado Rivera, The EU-Malaysia FTA: An Overdue Assignment, NEW EUROPE,
Aug. 29, 2010, http://www.neurope.eu/article/eu-malaysia-fta-overdue-assignment.
13
Id.
12
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Political Disputes Undermined the EU’s Engagement with ASEAN

In late 2010, the EU abandoned its attempts to forge an overall trade
deal with Southeast Asia as a trading bloc through its negotiations with
ASEAN. 14 Publicly, the EU asserted that “different levels of economic
development within the 10-member alliance” contributed to the stalemate.15
Many diplomats present at the negotiations, however, speculated that the
breakdown in negotiations had more to do with the human rights record of
military-ruled ASEAN member Myanmar. 16 The EU maintains sanctions
against Myanmar and requires that all signatories to any trade agreement
with the European Community make commitments to uphold international
human rights norms and enact certain democratic reforms as a precondition
to trade.17 Disputes over either issue may have derailed negotiations.
In place of the failed ASEAN negotiations, the EU is attempting to
reach Free Trade Agreements (“FTAs”) with the individual ASEAN
member-nations. Already, the EU has signed an FTA with South Korea that
many trade analysts are calling “the biggest bilateral deal in trade history”18
and has opened trade negotiations with both Vietnam and Singapore.19
B.

The EU Is Likely to Begin a Bilateral Trading Relationship with
Malaysia

Recently, the European Commission (“EC”) president has shifted
focus towards establishing a trade agreement with Malaysia. Using the
opportunity provided by the October 2010 Asia-Europe Meeting, Malaysian
Prime Minister Mohd Najib Abdul Razak and EC President Jose Manuel
Barosso announced the beginning of bilateral trade negotiations.20
Most reports indicate optimism concerning the future of negotiations
between Malaysia and the EU.21 Malaysia is heavily reliant upon trade with
the EU, which accounts for 11.2% of all of Malaysia’s trade and an annual
14
Agence France-Presse, EU, Malaysia to Start Free Trade Talks, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD,
Oct.
6,
2010, http://www.smh.com.au/business/world-business/eu-malaysia-to-start-free-trade-talks20101006-166l7.html.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.; J. ORSTROM MOLLER, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: SHARING OF EXPERIENCES 350 (2008).
18
John W. Miller, EU, Malaysia Launch Trade Deal, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Oct. 5, 2010,
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2010/10/05/eu-malaysia-announce-free-trade-deal/.
19
France-Presse, supra note 14.
20
Agence France-Presse, EU, Malaysia Kick Off Free Trade Talks, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA,
Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific_business/view/1085334/1/html.
21
Jackon Sawatan, Malaysia and EU to Begin FTA Talks in December, Says Najib, BERNAMA,
Oct. 6, 2010, http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v5/newsbusiness.php?id=532979.
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inflow of $13.6 billion. 22 The EU similarly desires a stable economic
relationship with Malaysia to ensure competitive access to Southeast Asia,
as compared to China, which has already signed a trade agreement with
ASEAN.23 Thus, both parties have an economic and political interest in a
timely and successful conclusion to trade negotiations.
Despite the above-mentioned potential for a successful trade deal
between Malaysia and the EU, a controversial policy threatens to derail the
negotiations: the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive (“RED”).24 The EU’s
RED policy mandates that 20% of all energy used in the EU come from
renewable energy sources and grants an excise tax exemption to any energy
source counted towards that 20% target.25 It additionally mandates that by
2020, the EU must derive 10% of its energy from biofuels.26 However, only
biofuels that emit 35% less greenhouse gas than traditional fossil fuels count
towards the 10% goal and thereby qualify for RED tax incentives.27
The controversy surrounding the policy stems from the fact that
European scientists indicate that rapeseed oil biofuel, most of which is
produced domestically, qualifies to be counted towards the 10% target
because it emits approximately 38% less greenhouse gas than fossil fuels.28
In contrast, scientists have determined that palm oil biofuel, which the EU
imports largely from Malaysia, emits about 19% less greenhouse gas than
traditional fossil fuels, leaving it far below the level required to qualify for
RED’s excise tax exemption.29 Malaysian palm oil producers argue that this
determination renders palm oil “virtually unmarketable” within the EU
member states because, without the RED tax benefit, palm oil would be
more expensive than both fossil fuels and comparable domestically produced
biofuels.30
22

Id.
Id.; Le Tian, China, ASEAN Sign Trade Agreement, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 15, 2007,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-01/15/content_783185.htm.
24
In addition to resolving disputes concerning the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive, several major
issues will need to be addressed over the course of the negotiations between the EU and Malaysia. These
will include issues such as intellectual property rights, government procurement, and sustainable
development. International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development, EU and Malaysia Kick Off
FTA Talks, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEWS DIGEST, Oct. 7, 2010, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/86
149/.
25
FREDRIK ERIXON, GREEN PROTECTIONISM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: HOW EUROPE’S BIOFUELS
POLICY AND THE RENEWABLE ENERGY DIRECTIVE VIOLATE WTO COMMITMENTS 21 (Eur. Ctr. for Int’l
Political Econ. ed., 2009).
26
Alan Swinbank, EU Policies on Bioenergy and Their Potential Clash with the WTO, J. AGRIC.
ECON. 60(3), 485-86 (2009).
27
Id.
28
ERIXON, supra note 25, at 29.
29
Id.
30
Rivera, supra note 12.
23
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Due to the RED’s one-sided effect, Malaysia considers the EU policy
nothing more than an example of self-interested “green protectionism.” 31
Green protectionism, according to Fredrik Erixon, the father of the concept,
is the practice of “adding non-environmental objectives that are
discriminatory, or overtly trade restrictive in intent and/or effect, to
environmental policy.” 32 Some Malaysian producers see the RED’s 35%
emissions reduction requirement as an example of an arbitrary
environmental standard included in the policy only because of its benefit to
domestically produced rapeseed at the expense of imported Malaysian palm
oil.33
Due to increasing accusations that the RED is being used in a
protectionist manner, the Malaysian government has received a number of
demands from palm oil producers to resolve the issue through a WTO suit.34
While the Malaysian government often suggests it may file such a suit, it has
not yet chosen to do so.35 Nevertheless, commentators have predicted that a
WTO panel will likely side with Malaysia if it does challenge the EU’s
measure. 36 The reasoning behind these predictions stems from a
conventional understanding of the WTO’s basic free trade tenets: that if a
foreign product looks like a domestic product and serves the same purpose
as a domestic product, then it ought not be sanctioned or taxed differently
from that domestic product.37 Because rapeseed oil and palm oil are virtually
indistinguishable in terms of their physical characteristics and functions,
some commentators conclude the WTO will attempt to allow Malaysian
palm oil to compete openly and freely in Europe by demanding a repeal of
the EU’s RED. The WTO will likely deem the RED policy an arbitrary
imposition into the functioning of the free market and a restriction on
consumer choice.38
This type of reasoning concerning “like products,” which
unrelentingly favors increased consumer choice and free competition in
foreign markets, has historically functioned well for the WTO and its
member nations as a firewall against protectionist policies that have
threatened the global trading system and international stability. 39 The
31

ERIXON, supra note 25, at 2.
Id.
33
Id. at 29.
34
Adnan, supra note 9.
35
Sawatan, supra note 21.
36
Rivera, supra note 12.
37
Adnan, supra note 9.
38
Id.
39
World Trade Organization, The System Helps to Keep the Peace, Sept. 18, 2011,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/10ben_e/10b01_e.htm.
32
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following section suggests, nevertheless, that it is time it be reconsidered.
Today’s international market is increasingly complex and deeply influenced
by a host of social, environmental, political, and economic factors. Each of
these market forces is, however, almost entirely overlooked by the WTO’s
conventional reasoning, which instead myopically focuses only on the
consumer’s perception of the product and the service it provides to that
consumer. Such a focus not only fails to promote a modern and effective
system of free trade, but is also counterproductive to the protection of
comparative advantage.
III.

TRADITIONAL “LIKENESS” DETERMINATIONS ARE INADEQUATE IN THE
CONTEXT OF AN EU-MALAYSIA WTO SUIT

Since its inception, the WTO has concerned itself with protecting free
and fair competition between “like” products in the international arena. It
has never, however, explicitly laid out a definition of what constitutes
“likeness.” As a result, the organization historically has struggled to
establish rational or consistent methods for determining “like products.”
Although a few methods of comparison now dominate the analysis, they are
largely inappropriate for, and inapplicable to, an effective analysis of
Malaysia’s proposed suit.
A.

The WTO Panels Have Developed Two Primary Methods for
Determining Likeness in Response to a Lack of Consensus or
Guidance from International Trade Policymakers

Following World War II, in an attempt to build safeguards into the
international trading system to prevent unrestrained protectionism and the
risk of another global economic downturn, the United States proposed to its
major trading partners the establishment of a treaty on global tariff.40 The
United States’ proposal became the basis for the General Agreement on
Tariff and Trade (“GATT”), which twenty-three countries signed and
implemented in 1948. 41 The GATT then became the basis of the
international trading system for nearly forty-seven years and is still included
amongst the treaties that govern the WTO and its member nations. It is also
the bedrock of one of the most basic premises of international trade law:
“like products” in international commerce should not be treated differently

40
41

NARLIKAR, supra note 1, at 10.
Id. at 15.
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simply because of their nation of origin. 42 Various formulations of this
proposition are found throughout the text of the GATT itself.43
However, soon after its creation, an increasingly globalized and
complex international trading system demanded more than the GATT could
provide. One element missing from the GATT, for example, was a means of
enforcing its non-discrimination provisions. 44 A formal enforcement
mechanism for GATT non-discrimination provisions would not exist until
the creation of the WTO and its 1995 Understanding on Rules and Procedure
Governing the Settlement of Disputes (“DSU”), which established, among
another things, an international arbitration system to ensure compliance with
international trade regulations among WTO members.45
The DSU system provides that, if the principle of non-discrimination
has allegedly been violated, a WTO member may file a complaint with the
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). 46 The DSB makes the final
decision concerning the outcome of the trade dispute.47 However, the DSB
does not actually hear or review the arguments presented by the parties in
dispute.48 Instead, it convenes a panel that engages in a type of hearing
known as an examination.49 Based on the examination results, WTO panels
issue reports and recommendations to the DSB (which the DSB nearly
always adopts).50 Panel recommendations concerning a party found to be in
violation of WTO policy range from a mandate requiring that a violating
country alter its domestic policy (to come into compliance with the WTO’s
non-discrimination principles) to authorization for the aggrieved WTO
member to engage in trade retaliation (sometimes the panel gives
authorization even for the imposition of sanctions). 51 The WTO panel
recommendations not only bind the disputing parties but also influence
42

Hudec, supra note 3.
GATT, Article I, Paragraph I reads, for example, that “any advantage . . . granted by any
contracting party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of all other
contracting parties.” GATT, Article III, Paragraph 2 also explains that “[t]he products of the territory of
any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly
or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied, directly or
indirectly, to like domestic products.” Similarly, Article III, Paragraph 4 mandates that “[t]he products of
the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin.”
44
NARLIKAR, supra note 1, at 50.
45
Id. at 130.
46
Id. at 135-36.
47
Id. at 137.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 133-35.
50
Id. at 50.
51
Id.
43
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WTO trade policy and subsequent panel decisions through a form of de facto
precedent.52
Despite decades of precedent developed by WTO panels that have
been tasked with interpreting and enforcing the GATT for its signatories, the
concept of a “like product” remains poorly defined.53 In fact, many WTO
panelists and commentators agree that while the question of “likeness” arises
in a majority of WTO panel decisions, “the definition of [a] like or directly
competitive or substitutable product . . . is yet to be settled.”54 Nevertheless,
there are two dominant methods to determine “likeness” that the WTO
would likely apply in Malaysia’s proposed suit.
The first approach compares the physical characteristics of the
products.55 In other words, if products look alike, then they are alike for the
sake of a physical characteristics-based determination of “likeness.” 56 A
WTO panel decision explored this method in the Japanese Alcoholic
Beverages case. Japanese Alcoholic Beverages panel considered whether
vodka could be considered “like” the Japanese distilled spirit shōchū.57 In
determining “likeness,” the panel reasoned that “products having no
substantial noticeable differences in physical characteristics ought to be
considered like.” 58 Thus, since vodka and shōchū are both “white/clean
spirits made of similar raw materials,”59 the panel held they are “like” and
should be treated similarly.60
The second dominant method of determining “likeness” focuses on
products’ end uses when purchased by the consumer. Accordingly, if one
product serves the same purpose as another, the products are considered
substitutable and, therefore, “like” one another. 61 For example, in EECMeasures on Animal Feed Proteins, the panel found that “vegetable proteins
and denatured skim milk powder were like”62 because they both shared a
52

MICHAEL LANG, JUDITH HERDIN & INEST HOFBAUER, WTO AND DIRECT TAXATION 62 (2005).
Marco Bronkers & Natalie McWelis, Rethinking the “Like Product” Definition in WTO
Anti-Dumping Law, 33 J. WORLD TRADE 73 (1999).
54
CHOI, supra note 11, at xix; see also Hudec, supra note 3; Weihuan Zhou, Non-Discrimination
and the Accordion of ‘Like Product’, July 15, 2007, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000173.
55
Hudec, supra note 3.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Report of the Panel, Japan – Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines
and Alcoholic Beverages, L/6216 (Nov. 10, 1987), GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 83 (1988) [hereinafter
Japan Wine].
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Hudec, supra note 3, at 103.
62
Report of the Panel, EEC – Measures on Animal Feed Proteins, L/4599 (Mar. 14, 1978), GATT
B.I.S.D. (25th Supp.) at 49 (1978).
53
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common use: a “protein source [used] . . . in feeding stuffs for animals.”63
Similarly, in Spanish Coffee, the panel found that all varieties of coffee are
“like” because they share a “well defined and single [end use] . . .
drinking.”64
Both of the above-described methods focus on the consumer of the
good in question. A physical characteristics method considers how a
product looks on a store shelf, while the end use method considers for what
purpose the customer would purchase the product. As a result of the focus
on the consumer, however, these traditional methods tend to exclude from
consideration important differences in production methods and nonconsumer-based market interactions.
B.

Neither an “End Use” nor a “Physical Characteristics” Analysis Can
Effectively Address the Relationship Between Palm Oil and Rapeseed
Oil in the Context of a Malaysian Suit

An analysis using these traditional methods of determining “likeness”
would indicate that Malaysia does indeed have a compelling case that two
like products (palm oil and rapeseed oil) are being treated differently. 65
Applying a physical characteristics model, the two products are almost
indistinguishable. Both are yellow vegetable oils that could easily be
mistaken for each other or even for other types of vegetable oil such as corn
oil. Further, both generally serve one of two purposes: energy production
(in the form of biofuel) or food. Therefore, under either a physical
characteristics or end use analysis, the two products should be considered
“like.”
These analyses, however, mask real differences between the products
that should interest and concern both the global trading system and national
regulators.66 Considering just the case of rapeseed and palm oil, both the
physical characteristics and end use approaches ignore, among other things,
the different levels of greenhouse gas emitted by the burning of the oils,67
the different amount of land required to grow them, the differing costs of
production, and their differing energy densities. 68 Each of these factors,
however, clearly evidence important differences between the products that
63

Id.
Report of the Panel, Spain – Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee, L/5135 (June 11, 1981), GATT
B.I.S.D. (28th Supp.) at 102 (1981) [hereinafter Spanish Coffee].
65
Rivera, supra note 12.
66
Id.
67
ERIXON, supra note 25.
68
Id.
64
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pertain to the development of an efficient system of international trade and
competition.
Consider, for example, the land use factor. Two products that serve
an identical function but require different levels of land for their growth,
development, or production would be determined to be “like” under an “end
use” analysis. Such a determination would make it impossible, within the
WTO’s guidelines, for a nation to incentivize products that make effective,
efficient, and sustainable use of land, thereby discouraging innovation and
competition in that arena and instead encouraging a wasteful use of property.
Traditional “likeness” determinations thus preclude the WTO from
achieving its goal of encouraging optimally efficient use of the world’s
resources. Therefore, in the context of the presently proposed Malaysian
suit, the WTO panel ought to consider “likeness” determinations that can
more effectively address these potential vectors of comparison. The
following section suggests that an economic likeness determination may be
able to do so.
IV.

AN ECONOMIC DETERMINATION OF “LIKENESS” SHOULD BE USED BY
THE WTO IN CONSIDERING MALAYSIA’S PROPOSED DISCRIMINATION
SUIT

In his text, “Like Products” in International Trade Law, Won-Mog
Choi makes a compelling case for the proposition that the WTO should
apply a “market-oriented analysis” when considering which products should
be viewed as “like” or competitive within the meaning of the GATT.69 An
economic analysis, Choi argues, would not only coincide with the goals of
the treaty but could provide “predictability and consistency” 70 to the
decisions of WTO panels.
The following section provides: 1) a useful method of applying an
economic or market-based “likeness” determination, 2) an application of an
economic likeness determination to the facts of Malaysia’s proposed suit,
concluding that palm oil and rapeseed oil are not “like” and, therefore, that
Malaysia’s discrimination suit should fail before the WTO DSB, and 3) an
overview of the benefits of an economic likeness determination in the
proposed Malaysian suit.

69
70

CHOI, supra note 11, at xxi.
Id. at xix.
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A Useful Means of Employing an “Economic Likeness” Test Is to
Calculate a Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand Between the Products
in Question

To some extent, the WTO panels have followed Choi’s
recommendations for a more economically and market-focused “likeness”
analysis.71 Recent panel decisions have included certain economic analyses
in their decision-making.72 For example, in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages,
the panel noted:
[T]he decisive criterion in order to determine whether two
products are directly competitive or substitutable is whether
they have common end-uses, inter alia, as shown by elasticity
or substitution . . . . The panel noted that the extent to which two
products are competitive in economics is measured by the
responsiveness of the demand for one product to the change in
the demand for the other product . . . . Ideally, one would like to
see the test for the relationship between the price of one product
and the demand for another, all things being equal.73
The type of competition analysis provided by the Japanese Alcoholic
Beverages panel is known as a “cross-price elasticity of demand analysis.”74
Similarly, in Korea Alcoholic Beverages, the panel relied “heavily upon the
merit of [a] Dodwell Study” that was “a cross-price elasticity of demand
analysis” similar to the one used in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages.75
The cross-price elasticity of demand between two goods is the level to
which the demand for one product will increase due to the increased price of
another product.76 “Cross-price elasticity is [expressed mathematically by
the following equation]:
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%77
where Pj denotes the initial price of good j and Qi denotes the initial quantity
of good i demanded.”78 The result can be either positive or negative. If
έQiPj is positive, as a general matter, it indicates that “a higher price for good
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at 22.
Id.
Japan Wine, supra note 58.
CHOI, supra note 11, at 12.
Id. at 26.
DAVID BESANKO, RONALD BRAEUTIGAM & MICHAEL J. GIBBS, MICROECONOMICS 52 (2010).
WILLIAM BOYES & MICHAEL MELVIN, MICROECONOMICS 107 (2011).
BESANKO ET AL., supra note 76.
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j increases the quantity of good i demanded [and, therefore,] goods i and j
are demand substitutes.”79 If έQiPj is negative then, as a general matter, “a
higher price for good j decreases the quantity of good i demanded [and,
therefore,] goods i and j are demand supplements.”80 A positive result, then,
would indicate that the two products are competitive with one another and
are “like” as far as the market is concerned, while a negative result would
indicate just the opposite—“unlike” or non-competitive products.
The WTO has not, however, accepted that a positive ratio alone is
sufficient evidence to indicate that two products are “like” or competitive.
The panel in Chilean Alcoholic Beverages, for example, found “a cross-price
elasticity of demand for pisco with respect to whisky . . . to be 0.26.”81 Such
a ratio, they explained, was:
a “low” level of elasticity [but] not necessarily fatal to a claim
of direct competitiveness or substitutability, although a high
coefficient of cross-price elasticity would be important
evidence to demonstrate that products are directly competitive
provided that the quality of the statistical analysis is high.82
Thus, while Chilean Alcoholic Beverages does seem to stand for the
proposition that a 0.26 demand elasticity is too low, it does not provide an
indication of what is “high enough” to indicate “likeness” or substitutability
within the meaning of the GATT.83
Two WTO Panel decisions, however, do offer some guidance as to
what level of elasticity would be high enough. The first is Japanese
Alcoholic Beverages. 84 The panel in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages
indicated that “between 4 and 10[%] of consumers would switch from
shōchū to whisky or vice versa respectively if one was not available any
more.” 85 It went on to note that “a 10[%] switch is a significant
substitution.”86 Thus, an upper bound of at least a 10% switching rate has
79

Id.
Id.
81
CHOI, supra note 11, at 28.
82
Panel Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/R, WT/DS110/R (Jan. 12, 2000),
as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R, DSR 2000:I, 303 [hereinafter
Chilean Alcoholic Beverages].
83
Id.
84
It is relevant to note that in Japanese Alcoholic Beverages, the panel did not, strictly speaking,
engage in the above described cross-price elasticity of demand analysis. Instead, it relied on a market
research study, which asked consumers whether they would purchase whiskey if shōchū were no longer
available to them. This type of analysis is referred to as a “non availability analysis” and has been
criticized by some as unlikely to occur in the real market and tending to exaggerate the switching rate.
Japan Wine, supra note 58.
85
Id.
86
Id.
80
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been found by one WTO panel to be meaningful in a “likeness” or
“substitutability” analysis.87 Similarly, although perhaps less helpfully, the
panel in Canada Periodical explained that “perfect substitutability [a ratio of
1.00] is not necessary” for a determination of “competition” or “likeness”
between two products.88
Based on this precedent, the WTO should adopt a cross-price
elasticity of demand analysis as a means of determining whether two
products should be considered “like.” The analyses should consider positive
ratios lower than 0.26 to be inconsequential and those greater than 1.00 to be
meaningful to an assessment of “likeness.” Such a method ensures that the
WTO addresses discrimination between products that compete as a matter of
empirical and economic reality, as opposed to those products that only
appear to compete in the mind of a consumer or WTO panelist. The
following section conducts such an analysis in the context of Malaysia’s
proposed suit.
B.

A Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand Analysis of Malaysian Palm Seed
Oil and European Rapeseed Oil Indicates a Negative Demand Ratio

The following cross-price elasticity of demand analysis concerning
Malaysian palm oil and European rapeseed oil only considers data from
2008 and 2009. Prior to these years, both the rapeseed and palm oil energy
markets were still vastly out-competed by oil and natural gas and were in
fledgling stages of development, making data from these years less
predictive of future events in this market.89 After December 2009, however,
the RED had been adopted and was already in force.90 Thus, including the
2010 data would fail to achieve the goal of considering the competitive
relationship of the products outside the influence of the challenged policy
(EU RED).91

87

Id.
Panel Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/R and Corr.1
(July 30, 1997), as modified by Appellate Body Report WT/DS31/AB/R, DSR 1997:I, 481.
89
JOSE GOLDEMBERG & OSWALDO LUCON, ENERGY, ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT 170 (2010).
90
CINNAMON PIÑON CARLARNE, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW AND POLICY: EU AND US APPROACHES 299
(2010).
91
Japan Wine, supra note 58.
88
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In 2008, the EU imported the following levels of palm oil from
Malaysia:
2008 EU IMPORTS OF MALAYSIAN PALM OIL (MILLION TONNES)92
June 2008
July 2008
August 2008
September 2008
October 2008
November 2008
December 2008

156,080
171,018
197,181
163,489
232,106
177,999
244,189

During the same months, the following crude rapeseed oil prices were
reported in U.S. dollars per metric ton:93
2008 CRUDE RAPESEED OIL (U.S.D./TON)94
June 2008
July 2008
August 2008
September 2008

1,639.55
1,736.46
1,467.67
1,352.99

92
Monthly
Palm
Oil
Trade
Statistics,
MALAYSIAN
PALM
OIL
COUNCIL,
http://www.mpoc.org.my/Monthly_Palm_Oil_Trade_Statistics.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
93
It is perhaps relevant to note here that EU imports are reported in metric tons or ‘tonnes’ (a unit of
mass equal to 2,205 lbs), a slightly different measurement than the U.S. price, which is reported in ‘tons’ (a
unit of mass equal to 2,000 lbs). However, this is irrelevant to a cross-price elasticity demand analysis
which does not compare price and demand in absolute terms.
94
Rapeseed
Oil
Monthly
Price,
INDEX
MUNDI,
http://www.indexmundi.com/commodities/?commodity=rapeseedoil&months=60
(last
visited
Feb. 10, 2012).
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Thus, 2008 provides the following cross-price elasticity of demand ratios for
palm oil and rapeseed oil:
DATES
June-July
July-August
August-September
SeptemberOctober
October-November

ELASTICITY
1.161920289295
-0.988319566
2.186766741
-2.796077705

RESULT
Demand Substitute96
Demand Supplement97
Demand Substitute
Demand Supplement

3.5405759488

Demand Substitute

Because the elasticity of demand between palm oil demand and rapeseed
price in 2008 vacillated so drastically month-to-month, these results are not
terribly instructive. However, taken as a whole, the 2008 data points
indicate a weak demand substitute of +0.140569088.
In 2009, the EU imported the following levels of palm oil from
Malaysia:98
2009 EU IMPORTS OF MALAYSIAN PALM OIL (MILLION TONNES)99
January 2009
February 2009
March 2009
April 2009
May 2009
June 2009
July 2009

95

142,246
114,973
152,589
177,412
140,226
148,183
161,066

Given by:
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%(171018-156080 /156080i) x 100% 14938/15608 0.0957073296
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100% (1736.46-1639.55j /1639.55) x 100% 96.91/1639.55 0.059107682
For full cross-price elasticity calculations, see infra Appendix A.
96
Because the result is positive, it indicates a “demand substitute” relationship. See BESANKO ET AL.,
supra note 76.
97
Because the result is negative, it indicates a “demand supplement” relationship. See id.
98
Monthly Palm Oil Trade Statistics, supra note 92.
99
Id.
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During the same months, the following crude rapeseed oil prices were
reported in U.S. Dollars per metric ton:
2009 CRUDE RAPESEED OIL (U.S.D./TON)100
January 2009
February 2009
March 2009
April 2009
May 2009
June 2009
July 2009
August 2009
September 2009
October 2009
November 2009

840.72
767.78
731.63
802.12
901.37
910.48
857.40
875.75
856.85
885.83
923.98

Using the above-discussed formula, this information provides the following
cross-price elasticity of demand ratios for palm oil and rapeseed oil in 2009:
DATE
January-February
February-March
March-April
April-May
May-June
June-July
July-August
August-September
September-October
October-November

100

ELASTICITY OF
DEMAND
2.20993101
-6.94865777
16.8515229519
-1.69396
5.6144135
-1.491277723
-18.351817429
-22.62098045
7.064577396
2.704367613

RESULT
Demand Substitute
Demand Supplement
Demand Substitute
Demand Supplement
Demand Substitute
Demand Supplement
Demand Supplement
Demand Supplement
Demand Substitute
Demand Substitute

Rapeseed Oil Monthly Price, supra note 94.
Given by:
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%(114973-142246 /142246i) x 100%-27273/142246- 0.19173123
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100
(767.78-840.72 /840.72) x 100%
-72.94/840.72
-0.08675897
For full cross-price elasticity calculations, see infra Appendix A.
101

416

PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL

VOL. 21 NO. 2

As in 2008, there is a fair amount of variation from month-to-month;
however, the data from 2009 provides a stronger overall trend. Taken as a
whole, the 2009 data points indicate a strong demand supplement of
-1.666189732543077.
Overall, the data from June 2008 to December 2009 indicate a
negative cross-price elasticity of demand ratio between palm oil and
rapeseed oil. It seems, therefore, that two products that are commonly
considered competitive in the European energy commodities market may
actually supplement each other’s demand.
How can this seemingly paradoxical result be understood? While a
number of factors influence the relationship between these two products,
researchers have identified “indirect land use change” as particularly
significant, and it may explain the above results.102 Indirect land use change
is a term used generally in the context of biofuel production and refers to “a
different use [for land]—such as food or feed production—[that] took place
on land used for energy crop cultivation and is thereby displaced.” 103
Generally speaking, indirect land use change can occur because, “to the
extent that demand remains for the food or feed previously produced on
[the] land [in question], its production is likely to shift elsewhere.” 104
However, according to a study conducted by E4tech,105 because historic data
indicate that the demand for food crops in the EU will remain relatively
stable, it is a fair assumption that demand for biodiesel in Europe will result
in more rapeseed production and planting, but that the traditional
displacement of food cropland for energy production is not likely to occur.
The reason stems from the fact that “oilseed rape achieves low gross
margins relative to cereal [or food] crops” 106 as demonstrated in the
following chart:
CROP
Feed Wheat
Feed Barley
Rapeseed
Field Beans
102

GROSS MARGIN (£/HA)107
405
248
130
254

E4tech, Indirect Land Use Change Impacts of Oilseed Rape for Biodiesel (unpublished, 2010),
available at http://www.ilucstudy.com/files%5CRapeseed_AnalysisV2.pdf.
103
RENATE SCHUBERT ET AL., FUTURE BIOENERGY AND SUSTAINABLE LAND USE 172 (2010).
104
Id.
105
E4tech is an international business consultancy focused on sustainable energy. E4tech, supra note
102.
106
Id. at 6.
107
Id.
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Thus, from a purely economic standpoint, the likelihood of rapeseed
displacing mainstream food crops is quite low. However, the E4tech study
indicates that rapeseed does compete well in the area of “break crop”
selection.108 A “break crop” is a crop grown in between fields of cereal and
food to ensure a varied planting pattern and to replenish the soil.109 Because
rapeseed has “relatively higher nitrogen transfer . . . and [relatively better] . . .
crop cover [to] . . . protect against soil erosion,” it is likely that “increasing
demand for biodiesel . . . will lead to oilseed rape,” outcompeting other break
crops such as sunflower, potatoes, sugar beet, peas, etc.110
The E4tech study’s authors took particular note of the effect that
rapeseed competition would have on domestic soy production. For example,
they concluded that every ton of rapemeal produced in Europe would result
in the displacement of 0.605 tons of soybean.111 When combined with a
projected increase of rapeseed production of “3.3 million hectares of
additional oil-seed rape,” it results in approximately “6.4 Mtonnes of
[displaced domestic] soy” production.112
After this displacing effect of increased rapeseed on soy, however, the
competition to fill the European demand is not limited only to foreign soy
producers. In fact, according to E4tech predictions, “palm oil [is likely to] . . .
replace the displaced soy” because it is less expensive as an import than
soy.113 The “net result,” according to the study, “is that around 1.7 Mha of
additional palm production will be required due to soy being displaced [by
rapeseed demand for land and] it is assumed that this production will occur
in Malaysia.” 114 It is through this indirect benefit granted to palm oil
producers via soy displacement that rapeseed oil’s negative elasticity of
demand ratios for palm oil can be partially explained. It is also relevant to
note that this effect is not unknown to palm oil producers. The Malaysian
Oil Palm Board, for example, released a report predicting that “due to the
competitive price of palm oil vis-à-vis other competing oils such as soy oil . . .
[i]t is forecasted that about 10%-30% of the EU’s biodiesel requirement
could come from palm oil by 2010.”115

108

Id.
SCHUBERT ET AL., supra note 103, at 172.
110
Id.
111
E4tech, supra note 102.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Mohd Basri Wahi et al., EU’s Renewable Energy Directive: Possible Implications on Malaysian
Palm Oil Trade, 8(2) OIL PALM INDUSTRY ECON. J. 3 (2008).
109
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Only an “Economic Likeness” Analysis Can Meaningfully Address
the Impact of Indirect Land Use Change in the Malaysian Case and
Achieve the Goals of the WTO

Traditionally, a given product’s “likeness” to or substitutability for
another product depends on the total set of products that could potentially
substitute for the given product or the relevant market for comparison. For
example, in Korean Alcoholic Beverages, the panel found it difficult to
establish a meaningful or realistic competitive relationship between two
vodka-style drinks because it felt that the government policy in question
might significantly affect the likelihood of “switching” or would
“crystallize” a preference for one product or another in a given market.116
Therefore, the panel suggested that an appropriate method of determining
whether a product is “potential[ly] competitive or substitutab[le]” with
another would be to “consider the nature of the competitive relationship in
other markets . . . [or] a market that is relatively less affected by government
policies.”117
In the case of palm and rapeseed oil, due to the high level of
investment and political interest in both products, there are a significant
number of data points available to the general public concerning the EU’s
imports, Malaysian exports, and the relative price of the two products in the
European market both before and after the implementation of RED. Thus,
there is no need to analogize the EU to a foreign market. Nevertheless, the
relationship between rapeseed oil and palm oil can meaningfully show how
the market, used as a comparative data point, can significantly affect the
outcome of a “likeness” analysis in a WTO lawsuit.
In analyzing Malaysia’s proposed suit, if one were to limit the
“relevant market” to the EU, as demanded by traditional “likeness”
comparisons that focus on protecting consumer choice in a domestic market,
then a WTO panel would see rapeseed oil and palm oil as direct
competitors. 118 However, by expanding the relevant marketplace to the
entire globe, the peculiar positive and synergistic effect that domestic EU
rapeseed oil production has on imported Malaysian palm oil through
Brazilian soy presents itself more clearly. In other words, a marketplaceoriented price-elasticity analysis will achieve a more nuanced and useful
116
117
118

Japan Wine, supra note 58.
Id.
Id.
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understanding of the economic relationship between the two products. It is
only through an economic analysis of likeness that such a “de-bordering” of
the WTO “likeness” comparisons can take place because market indicators,
such as demand and price fluctuations in an increasingly globalized
economy, are less and less concerned (if at all) with national boundaries or
the “relevant market” as bounded and constituted by the minds or common
sense of the WTO panelists.
The value of increased recognition of and reliance upon these market
indicators by the WTO panelists addresses a fundamental aspiration housed
in the GATT: protecting comparative advantage.119 The rapeseed-soy-palm
oil interaction highlighted by a cross-price elasticity of demand analysis can
aid in recognizing the benefits of a market-based “likeness” determination.
Using a more traditional method of determining the “likeness” of palm oil to
rapeseed oil, it is almost a foregone conclusion that “likeness” would be
found. However, such a conclusion would encourage a European trade
policy favoring the production of domestic soy functionally subsidizing,
through international trade regulations, a crop that is more expensive and
less energy efficient than its competitor—palm oil.120 Traditional indicators
of “likeness” determinations, thus, can function against the vision of the
GATT and discourage the optimal use of the world’s resources.
Defenders of traditional methods of “likeness” determinations may,
however, voice a number of legitimate criticisms of a market-based
determination. While a market-based approach need not necessarily
displace other types of analysis, it may be useful to address some potential
concerns here.
The “end use” or “consumer choice” theory, for example, showed its
usefulness in the WTO’s Spanish Coffee decision. Spanish Coffee
concerned a 1979 Spanish decree, which established the following duties for
unroasted non-decaffeinated coffee beans:121
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
Colombian Mild
Other Mild
Unwashed Arabica
Robusta
Other
119
120
121

Id. at 26.
ERIXON, supra note 25.
Spanish Coffee, supra note 64, at 2.4.

DUTY RATE
Free
Free
7% ad. val.
7% ad. val.
7% ad. val.
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Because “Spain’s imports of unroasted coffee from Brazil were constituted
almost entirely of unwashed Arabica,” 122 the “representative of Brazil
argued that [imposing] a 7[%] tariff on . . . unwashed Arabica and Robusta . . .
while affording duty-free treatment to . . . other groups” was a violation of
the WTO’s non-discrimination principles.123 The panel in Spanish Coffee
agreed with the representative from Brazil, finding that all “unroasted, nondecaffeinated coffee beans listed in the Spanish Customs Tariffs . . . [are]
‘like products.’”124
The panel’s decision hinged largely on its observation that “unroasted
coffee was mainly, if not exclusively, sold in the form of blends, combining
various types of coffee.”125 Thus, Spain’s tariff distinctions meant absolutely
nothing to the end-user or purchaser of the coffee.126 The “end-use [of coffee
is] universally regarded as a well-defined and single product,” not five
different products as explained by the Spanish Coffee decree.127
Supporters of an “end use” or “consumer choice” theory of likeness
might point to the Spanish Coffee decision as evidence that only through the
eyes of a consumer can the true “likeness” of a product be determined. A
market-based approach, in contrast, could inappropriately find competition
between the unroasted beans in Spanish Coffee because of factors that are
irrelevant to consumers in the market, such as the price of labor in the region
where a particular bean is produced in or the comparative cost of crop
insurance for different methods of coffee farming. While such a view is
certainly not without merit, a market-based analysis would not entirely forgo
consideration of consumer choice. In fact, consumer demand represents one
of the major variables influencing the price of a product in a cross-price
elasticity determination. However, a market-based model has the flexibility
to consider not only consumer demand but also overall production costs.
While a critic might find error with a WTO panel finding that coffee
beans ground and blended together are in fact not “like products” (to the
consumer, it could be argued, they are literally the same product), it might
still be the case that, because of the farming or production methods used to
produce a particular type of product, similar financial or governmental
regulations simply should not be applied across the board. In a similar vein,
supporters of a “physical characteristics” method of determining “likeness”
might criticize the tendency of a market-based analysis to fabricate
122
123
124
125

126
127

Id. at 2.11.
Id. at 3.1.
Id. at 4.9.
Id. at 4.7.
Id. at 3.8.
Id. at 2.4.
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competition by pointing to the simple fact that “virtually all products have at
least a minimum cross-price elasticity with one another.”128 For example, it
has been well established that “the demand of sugar will be increased as a
result of the rising price of tea . . . . Indeed, sugar is related to tea indirectly
through coffee.” 129 An advocate of the physical characteristics method
might argue that an economic likeness theorist would extrapolate from that
interconnectedness to consider sugar and tea to be “like products.” A
physical characteristics analysis simply could not allow such a determination.
Again, each of the above criticisms of a market-based approach is
appropriate. However, the risk may be overstated. The WTO panelists have
established a minimum level of price elasticity required for a finding of
likeness. Recall, for example, the panel’s decision in Chilean Alcoholic
Beverages, finding that +0.26 was simply too low of a ratio to indicate
likeness.130
Standards, such as the one hinted at in Chilean Alcoholic Beverages,
would likely address the concern that a market-based analysis would be too
likely to find economic connections between products that have no
meaningful interaction. 131 Should this eventuality result, however, the
rewards outweigh the risk. It is a far lesser sin to take into account too much
economic and market-based information when making a decision concerning
international trade, with the result of finding competition and interactions
that are not obvious to the average consumer, than to ignore meaningful
information for the sake of a consumer’s common sense consideration.
Consider, for example, the way that a physical characteristics or
consumer choice/end use trade analyst might approach the case of a
challenge to differential treatment of organically-fed cruelty-free beef and
traditionally-fed and raised beef products. Organically and traditionally fed
ground beef have nearly imperceptible physical distinctions—certainly no
more different than vodka and shōchū. Further, their end use is precisely the
same—a protein rich food source. Thus, traditional methods of “likeness”
determinations might find “likeness” between these two products despite the
real differences that exist between them in calculating public health concerns,
costs to the environment, land use requirements, and production costs. Each
of these factors, however, significantly and meaningfully affects price and
demand and, therefore, must necessarily be included in an economic marketbased analysis.
128
129
130
131

CHOI, supra note 11, at 14.
Id. at 15.
Chilean Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 82.
Id.
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The WTO Should Adopt Cross-Price Elasticity of Demand as a Means
of Determining “Likeness” in Future Non-Discrimination Suits

Although Malaysia’s proposed suit specifically highlights the ways in
which a cross-price elasticity of demand analysis can enhance the efficiency
of the international trading system by elucidating economic interconnections
that might otherwise go unnoticed, the usefulness of such an approach
extends beyond this particular case and, if adopted, would provide the WTO
member states with a number of institutional and economic advantages.
First, it establishes a level of predictability in WTO rulings and the
environment in which global trade occurs. Instead of simply deferring to the
judgment of a hypothetical consumer concocted in the mind of a WTO
panelist, potential trading partners and/or WTO claimants can predict, in
advance, the outcome of a WTO challenge by applying a cross-price
elasticity of demand formula themselves. Further, the objective cross-price
elasticity of demand analysis allows domestic policymakers to craft
legislation that meets their needs without fear of running afoul of the often
unpredictable WTO jurisprudence concerning non-discrimination.
Second, this approach encourages faith in the institution of the WTO
itself. Even in the international trading system, economic actors can engage
in a certain amount of forum shopping concerning their preferred methods of
regulation.132 If the WTO system ceases to function for more sophisticated
market users, such as the EU, they may begin to seek alternative methods of
engaging in and structuring international trade. The evolution of the trade
partnership between Malaysia and the EU provides an example of this
phenomenon. While the EU initially engaged with ASEAN as a bloc, it
chose instead to form favorable trade relationships with ASEAN countries
through individual FTAs after political disputes between the two
organizations prevented an economically efficient partnership from
forming.133 While not a perfect analog to the institution of the WTO, the
EU’s strategy vis-à-vis ASEAN countries indicates that it and other
countries will find alternatives to WTO constraints if the WTO panels do not
conform their decisions to the ideals and demands of the market participants,
as expressed through basic market indicators such as price-demand ratios.
Those users may instead avoid altogether the constraints of the WTO by
negotiating their own trading rules through bilateral trade agreements. Such

132

Albert Fishlow, Brazil: FTA or FTAA or WTO?, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES
Schott ed., 2004).
Miller, supra note 18.

AND PRIORITIES 277 (Jeffrey J.
133
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a result could threaten the legitimacy of the WTO, reduce the efficiency of
the global market, and decrease global productivity.
V.

CONCLUSION

The danger of capitalism, as articulated by some of its critics, is a
tendency to “reduce all human interactions to commodity-relations of
universal equivalency.”134 However, this unrelenting impulse to reduce all
information and interactions to a market-useful value affords a marketoriented approach the ability to address effectively a host of human and
economic concerns. The Malaysian case provides the WTO with a useful
and appropriate opportunity to reconsider its traditional analysis concerning
“likeness” and product comparison to confront more appropriately the
challenges facing the international trading system.

134
Martin E. Rosenberg, Dynamic and Thermodynamic Tropes of the Subject in Freud and in
Deleuze and Guattari, in 4 POSTMODERN CULTURE 1 (1993).
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APPENDIX A
2008 ELASTICITY OF DEMAND CALCULATIONS
June – July
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (171018-156080 / 156080) x 100%  14938 / 15608
(1736.46-1639.55 / 1639.55) x 100%
96.91 / 1639.55
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

 0.0957073296
0.0591076820

July – August
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (197181-171018 /171018) x 100%  26163/171018

0.15298389600
(1467.67-1736.46 /1736.46) x 100%
-268.79/1736.46
-0.1547919330
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

August – September
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% (163489-197181 / 197181) x 100%  -33692/197181  -0.1708683900
1352.99-1467.67 / 1467.67) x 100%
-114.68/1467.67
-0.078137456
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

September – October
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (232106-163489 / 163489) x 100%  68617 / 163489  0.419704078
(1149.9-1352.99 / 1352.99) x 100%
-203.09 / 1352.99
-0.150104583
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

October – November
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (177999-232106 / 232106) x 100%  -54107 / 232106  -0.23311331891
(1074.19 -1149.9 / 1149.9) x 100%
-75.71 / 1149.9
-0.06584050800
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

2009 ELASTICITY OF DEMAND CALCULATIONS
January – February
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% 
(114973-142246 / 142246) x 100%  -27273 / 142246  -0.19173123
(767.78-840.72 / 840.72) x 100%
-72.94 / 840.72
-0.08675897
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

February – March
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% 
(152589-114973 / 114973) x 100% 
37616 / 114974  0.3271692095
(731.63-767.78 / 767.78) x 100%
-36.15 / 767.78
-0.0470838000
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

March – April
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% 
(177412-152589 / 15289) x 100%
(802.12-731.63 / 731.63) x 100%
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

 24823 / 15289 1.62358558440709
70.49 / 731.63
0.09634651948307

April – May
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100% 
(140226-177412 / 177412) x 100%  -37186 / 177412
-0.20960250715847
(901.37-802.12 / 802.12) x 100%
99.23 / 802.12
0.12373460330125
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

May – June
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (148183-140226 / 140226) x 100%  7957 / 140226  0.056744113074608
(910.48-901.37 / 901.37) x 100%
9.11 / 901.37
0.010106837369782
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

June – July
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (161066-148183 / 148183) x 100%  12883 / 148183  0.0869397974126590
(857.40-910.48 / 910.48) x 100%
-53.08 / 910.48
-0.058298919251384
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

MARCH 2012
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July – August
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (97805-161066/161066) x 100% -63261/161066  -0.392764456806520
(875.75-857.40 / 857.40) x 100%
18.35/857.40
0.021411901983664
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

August – September
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (145854-97805 / 97805) x 100%  48049 / 97805  0.4912734522774910
(856.85-875.75 / 875.75) x 100%
-18.9 / 875.75
-0.021581501570083
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

September – October
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (180332-145554 / 14554) x 100%  34778 / 145554  0.23893537793533
(885.83-856.85 / 856.85) x 100%
28.98 / 856.85
0.033821555698197
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%

October – November
έQiPj = (∆Qi /Qi) x 100%  (201335-180332 / 180332) x 100%  21003 / 180332  0.116468513630415
(923.98-885.83 / 885.83) x 100%
38.19 / 885.83
0.043066954155989
(∆Pj /Pj) x 100%
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APPENDIX B
COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT OF VEGETABLE OILS
*
IN AGRICULTURE (AG) AND PRODUCTION (PROD) BY PERCENTAGE
ACIDIFICATION
POTENTIAL

ENERGY
CONSUMPTION

GLOBAL
WARMING
POTENTIAL

AG

PROD

AG

PROD

AG

PROD

AG

PROD

AG

PROD

PALM OIL

41

22

62

7

77

1

97

-

34

6

PALM
KERNEL OIL

41

34

62

18

82

3

97

1

44

3

COCONUT
OIL

27

41

68

15

68

5

95

1

14

20

OLIVE OIL

69

9

79

4

93

1

98

-

62

4

SOYBEAN
OIL

40

30

48

22

50

12

82

5

21

60

RAPESEED
OIL

55

33

70

21

93

5

97

2

24

67

SUNFLOWER
OIL

56

30

78

14

87

5

98

1

25

61

PLANT OIL

EUTROPHICATION
POTENTIAL

PHOTOCHEMICAL
SMOG
POTENTIAL

*
Erich E Dumelin, The Environmental Impact of Palm Oil and Other Vegetable Oils, PALM OIL
DEVELOPMENTS, Dec. 2009, at 21, Table 1, http://palmoilis.mpob.gov.my/publications/pod51-erich.pdf.

